CARÁCTER PROSPECTIVO DE LA GARANTÍA DE SEGURIDAD DEL PUERTO: EL CASO DEL “EVIA Nº 2”

CARÁCTER PROSPECTIVO DE LA GARANTÍA DE SEGURIDAD DEL PUERTO: EL CASO DEL “EVIA Nº 2”

Respecto al fundamento de la responsabilidad del fletador que conlleva la garantía de seguridad en el Common Law, surge la pregunta: ¿es esa responsabilidad objetiva (esto es, en todo caso, bastando que se produzca el daño), o sólo si el fletador ha incurrido en culpa o negligencia respecto a la detectabilidad del peligro al designar el lugar inseguro?

A lo largo del tiempo se ha ido evolucionando de entender que la responsabilidad era objetiva, hacia una cierta  introducción del principio de negligencia, por la vía de admitir que, respecto a peligros anormales (es decir, no esperables para una persona razonable, además de anormales en el sentido de la definición de puerto seguro) surgidos con posterioridad a la nominación, se responde sólo por los daños derivados de aquellos cuya presencia fuese razonablemente predecible cuando se eligió el lugar. Es decir, se exige una due diligence respecto a la seguridad prospectiva del lugar. De hecho, si el peligro surgido con posterioridad a la nominación no es razonablemente previsible, propiamente, ni siquiera se podría hablar de supuesto de lugar inseguro.

Por supuesto, el contrato puede contener cláusulas que expresamente disciplinen esta materia, de modo que, por ejemplo, se pacte en todos los casos una obligación de due diligence respecto a la seguridad de los lugares que se eligen.

El cambio relevante de tendencia desde una garantía de seguridad del puerto absoluta hacia una garantía meramente prospectiva fue marcado por la jurisprudencia sentada por el caso del “Evia nº 2”, de 1983. 

Este buque había sido fletado por tiempo en 1979 con una póliza Baltime, por 18 meses. Como es típico de esta póliza, en la cláusula 2 había una garantía expresa de seguridad de los puertos a donde el fletador dirigiese el buque en el empleo de éste. En marzo de 1980 el fletador ordenó al “Evia nº 2” embarcar en puerto cubano un cargamento de material de construcción y conducirlo para su descarga en el puerto iraquí de Basrah. El barco atracó en este puerto y procedió a la descarga. Precisamente al terminar ésta tuvo lugar el inicio de la guerra entre Irán e Irak. Ello dio lugar a que se prohibiese la navegación en la zona, de manera que el “Evia nº 2” quedó atrapado en Basrah por largo tiempo.

Lo anterior dio lugar a un pleito entre armador y fletador, que involucraba varios aspectos, entre ellos, la frustración del contrato. Pero la faceta que más nos interesa aquí es que el armador, en apoyo de su posición argumentaba que el fletador había incumplido la garantía de seguridad del puerto de Basrah, recogida expresamente en la cláusula 2 de Baltime, al haber ordenado al buque ir a un puerto inseguro. Y sobre esto se pronunció la sentencia.

En primer lugar, hay que decir que se dio como cierto que el hecho de que en el momento en que el fletador ordenó al “Evia nº 2” proceder a Basrah, no había razón para pensar que iba a producirse una guerra y que, producto de ella, el buque iba a quedar atrapado sine-die en aquel puerto, o lo que es lo mismo, en suma, que Basrah se iba a convertir en un futuro en un puerto inseguro.

Precisamente lo anterior estaba en la clave de la jurisprudencia que se iba a sentar: como al momento de la orden de acudir al puerto en cuestión, al momento de la elección de ese puerto, podía razonablemente decirse que para un fletador cuidadoso no había motivos para pensar que dicho lugar iba a devenir peligroso para el tiempo de la estancia del buque, el fletador no había incumplido su obligación de ordenar un “safe port”. En definitiva: la obligación de seguridad del lugar, como seguridad prospectiva. 

Siguien algunos de los pasjes más importantes del ponente Lord Roskill que, además, entra en la cuestión, ya más propia de los time chárter que de los fletamentos por viaje, de ser un componente de la obligación de “puerto seguro” el de, surgida la inseguridad del puerto nominado, ciertas conductas para en lo posible solucionar la situación, como nominar un puerto alternativo si el buque está aún en viaje hacia el puerto sobrevenidamente peligroso, o si llegó ya a él, auspiciar la salida del mismo y señalar un destino alternativo seguro:

“…The charterer’s contractual promise must, I think, relate to the characteristics of the port or place in question and in my view means that when the order is given that port or place is prospectively safe for the ship to get to, stay at, so far as necessary, and in due course, leave. But if those characteristics are such as to make that port or place prospectively safe in this way, I cannot think that if, in spite of them, some unexpected and abnormal event thereafter suddenly occurs which creates conditions of unsafety where conditions of safety had previously existed and as a result the ship is delayed, damaged or destroyed, that contractual promise extends to making the charterer liable for any resulting loss or damage, physical or financial. So to hold would make the charterer the insurer of such unexpected and abnormal risks which in my view should properly fall upon the ship’s insurers under the policies of insurance the effecting of which is the owner’s responsibility under clause 3 unless, of course, the owner chooses to be his own insurer in these respects . . .

… My Lords, on the view of the law which I take, since Basrah was prospectively safe at the time of nomination, and since the unsafety arose after the Evia’s arrival and was due to an unexpected and abnormal event, there was at the former time no breach of clause 2 by the respondents, and that is the first ground upon which I would dismiss this appeal…

… My Lords, in the case of a time charterer, I cannot bring myself to think that he has no further obligation to the owner even though for the reasons I have given earlier he is not the insurer of the risks arising from the unsafety of the nominated port. Suppose some event has occurred after nomination which has made or will or may make the nominated port unsafe. Is a time charterer obliged to do anything further?...

… In this connection two possible situations require to be considered. The first situation is where, after the time charterer has performed his primary obligation by ordering the ship to go to a port which, at the time of such order, was prospectively safe for her, and while she is still proceeding towards such port in compliance with such order, new circumstances arise which render the port unsafe. The second situation is where, after the time charterer has performed his primary obligation by ordering the ship to go to a port which was, at the time of such order, prospectively safe for her, and she has proceeded to and entered such port in compliance with such order, new circumstances arise which render the port unsafe. In the first situation it is my opinion that clause 2, on its true construction (unless the cause of the new unsafety be purely temporary in character), imposes on the time charterer a further and secondary obligation to cancel his original order and, assuming that he wishes to continue to trade the ship, to order her to go to another port which, at the time when such fresh order is given, is prospectively safe for her. This is because clause 2 should be construed as requiring the time charterer to do all that he can effectively do to protect the ship from the new danger in the port which has arisen since his original order for her to go to it was given. In the second situation the question whether clause 2, on its true construction, imposes a further and secondary obligation on the time charterer will depend on whether, having regard to the nature and consequences of the new danger in the port which has arisen, it is possible for the ship to avoid such danger by leaving the port. If, on the one hand, it is not possible for the ship so to leave, then no further and secondary obligation is imposed on the time charterer. This is because clause 2 should not be construed as requiring the time charterer to give orders with which it is not possible for the ship to comply, and which would for that reason be ineffective. If, on the other hand, it is possible for the ship to avoid the new danger in the port which has arisen by leaving, then a further and secondary obligation is imposed on the time charterer to order the ship to leave the port forthwith, whether she has completed loading or discharging or not, and, assuming that he wishes to continue to trade the ship, to order her to go to another port which, at the time when such fresh order is given, is prospectively safe for her. This is again because clause 2 should be construed as requiring the time charterer to do all that he can effectively do to protect the ship from the new danger in the port which has arisen since his original order for her to go to it was given. My Lords, what I have said with regard to these further and secondary obligations under clause 2 of this charterparty will apply to any other similarly worded ‘safe port’ clauses. My Lords, for the reasons I have given I find it much more difficult to say what are the comparable obligations under a voyage charterparty at any rate where there is no express right to renominate...

. . . I think, therefore, in a case where only a time charterparty is involved, that it would be unwise for your Lordships to give further consideration to the problems which might arise in the case of a voyage charterparty, and for my part, I would leave those problems for later consideration if and when they arise…”